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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HERSCHEL J. SAPERSTEIN,
Trustee in llankrupky of the Estate of
\VIIEAT BROS. PAINTERS &
DECORATORS, a partnership,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No.
11768

v.
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF

CTAH, N.A., a corporation,

Defendant and Aprellt111f.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF CASE
This is an action under Section 60b of the Bankruptcy Act ( 11 U.S.C. §96) to recover on behalf of the
bankruptcy estate three separate sums transferred, in
the form of bank deposits, by the bankrupt ('Vheat
Bros.) to defendant First Security Bank of Utah within
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four months before the voluntary petition in bankruptcy
was filed.
·

DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
After a trial without a jury, the court found that
the three deposits were made and receive<l for the purpose of paying an antecedent debt, were not in the ordinary course of business, and were voidable preferences
under the Bankruptcy Act. .A.ccordingly, it entered
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the amount of $27 ,331.25, together with interest of $3,624.62, and $52.60 costs.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment.

STATE.NIENT OF FACTS
The facts set out in appellant's brief are essentially
correct, but incomplete. Failure to set out all of the
material evidence presented at the trial creates a serious
problem, because notwithstanding that appellant's brief
is cast primarily in the form of legal argument about
application of certain sections of the Bankruptcy Act,
the appeal is essentially an attack upon the sufficiency
of evidence to support findings of fact ma<le by the trial
court.
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Under Section (}O of the Bankruptcy Act any
transfer made by the bankrupt is to be set aside if the
trustee establishes the following:
rupt;

( 1) There was a transfer of property by the bank(:.:?) At the time of ihe transfer the transferee was

a creditor of the bankrupt;

The transfer was made in payment of an antecedent debt;
( H)

( 4)

The bankrupt was insolvent at the time of the

transfer;
( 5) The transfer was made wtihin four months

before the filing of a petition in bankruptcy;
( 6) The transfer enabled the transferee to obtain

a greater percentage of its debt than other creditors of
the same class; and
( 7) At the time of the transfer the transferee had

reasonable cause to believe that the bankrupt transferor
was insolvent.
[See ;3 Collier on B((11kruptc,1; (14th Ed.), Para.
150.0:.2; 9 Am. Jur. 2d, Bankruptcy,
The trial court made findings iu plaintiff's favor on
eaeh of the above issues ( R. 18-21), and most of the
fi11dings have not been challenged. For the purpose of
this appeal it must be deemed to be established that
there were three transfers of property by 'Vheat Bros.
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to defendant (Findings Nos. 5, 10, 14); defendant was
a creditor (Findings Nos. 4, 9, 13) ; lVheat Bros. was
insolvent at the time of eaeh transfer (Finding No. 18);
each transfer ·was made within four months before the
petition in bankruptcy was filed (Finding No. 17); and
the transfers enabled defendant to obtain a greater portion of its debt than other creditors of the same class
(Finding No. 21).
The findings challenged in this appeal are that
the transfers were for the purpose of paying antecede11t
debts (Findings Nos. 8, 12, 16), and that defendant had
reasonable cause to believe (and in fact knew) \\Theat
Bros. was inso!Yent at the time of each transfer (Findings Nos. 19, 20) .
Both of the challenged findings involve states of
mind best known to defendant and its officers. In considering the findings, therefore, the court should giYe
weight to the facts that most of the information surrounding the deposits is in the hands of the defendant;
that the plaintiff, representing the general creditors of
Wheat Bros., had to rely upon circumstantial evidence
to establish the relevant state of mind as it existed at the
time the transaction were entered into; and that defendants were not likely to publish their intent.
The facts and circumstances surrounding the dealings between \Vheat Bros. and defendant - both before
and after the transfers - affect the credibility of testimony presented by defendant. :Most of them are set
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out immediately below. Others will be dealt with specially in the argument.
\Vheat llros., a partnership consisting of James L.
\Vheat, .John Wheat and Joseph \Vheat (R. 47), was
a customer of defendant :First Security Bank. Prior to
the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, \Vheat Bros.
maintained a general checking account at the Sugarhouse office of defendant bank ( R. 73), and from time
to time also borrowed money from it ( R. 74). During
the period immediately preceding the deposits in question, \Vheat Bros. was indebted to defendant on two
separate $5,000.00 notes, one dated May 19, 1U65, maturing August 17, 1965, and one dated July 13, 1965,
maturing October 11, 1965 (R. 74; Ex. P-14).

In August, 1965, the \Vheat Bros. account went
into an overdraft condition ( R. 76) , which gradually
increased (R. 76) until at the close of business on September 21, 1965, \Vheat Bros. was indebted to defendant for overdrafts in the amount of $18,768.26 (R. 81;
Ex. P-12).
The bank officers were concerned about the partnership overdraft ( R. 112) and during the weeks preceding September 21 made frequent contacts with one
or another of the partners to find out when it would be
cleared (Ex. D-18; R. 83, 86, 87) . During these conversations the bank officers were told they were accounts receivable that would be paid to the partnership
and that deposits would be made to clear the overdraft
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(R. 83, Ex. D-14). On about September 16, 1965,
Jacobsen Construction Company drew a check in the
amount of $18, 150.00 payable joinHl'" to ''\Vheat
and Kaymac Sales" (Ex. P-11). 'Vheat llros. obtained
the endorsement of Kaymac Sales Company on the
check and in return gave Kaymac a \Vheat Bros. check
for $12,000.00, drawn on defendant (Ex. P-13).
On September 21, 1965, \Vheat .Bros. deposited
the $18,150.00 check at defendant's Sugarhouse office
together with some other checks in a total deposit of
$21,320.08 (Ex. P-10, P-12).
Jacobson Construction Company, drawer of the
$18,150.00 check, was known to be a company of financial stability, and the bank had no worry about the
availability of funds to pay the check ( R. 84). Nevertheless, the check was given special handling. Instead
of sending it through with the rest of the deposit, the
bank endorsed it "For Collection Only," and had it
carried by special messenger to the drawee, Zions First
National Bank (Ex. P-11; R. 75, 82, 85). Defendant
obtained a cashier's check from Zions payable to defendant, then deposited that check - not the Jacobsen check
- in the ':Vheat Bros. account (R. 85).
Defendant uses a computer system in connection
with its checking accounts, and as soon as a deposit is
placed into an account it is applied automatically against
an overdraft. This happened with respect to the deposit
made on September 21 (R. 86). Defendant dishonored
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the check given to Kaymac (Ex. P-13), and immediately ceased its practice of honoring '¥"heat Bros. overdrafts ( R. 86) . As soon as 'Vheat Bros. checks ha<l
use<l the balance of the September 22 deposit, def endant began returning checks unpaid whenever an overdraft \Vas encountered. Thereafter, overdrafts were not
countenced, though at times 'Vheat Bros. maintained
a balance in the account and drew checks on that balance
(R. 94).
\Vith respect to overdrafts in the 'Vheat Bros. aecount, it was the practice of defendant's officers to consider each overdraft before it was paid ( R. 78) ; in other
words, 'Vheat Bros. was not permitted to maintain an
overdraft position unless the payment of a particular
item was expressly approved by a bank officer.
On October 4, 1965, 'Vheat Bros. left with defendant for deposit to its account the sum of $7,384.00,
whereupon defendant immediately applied $5,131.25 of
the deposit to pay itself the entire principal and interest
on the note of :May 19, 1965, which had become due on
August 17, 1965 ( R. 94-95) . Defendant's records show
that the deposit was received and the application made
the same day (Exs. P-12, P-14).
Shortly before October 18, 1965, Joseph 'Vheat
found it necessary to collect various sums in order to
make a deposit to meet the partnership payroll, and on
that date he took to defendant for deposit the sum of
$4,153..J.8 (Ex. P-12). He handed the deposit to a
7

teller in the presence of the assistant manager, Jfoyd ._t
Lindquist (R. 53, 54). No comment was made about
setting this amount off, but on that same day defen<laiit
took $4,050.00 (which depleted the amount on <leposi t !
and applied it agaiust the $5,000.00 note that had become due on October 11, 1965 (Ex. P-1:?, R. 97).
tober 18 was the first date after the note's due date
when there was enough in the account to pay any substantial portion of the note (Ex. P-1:?), a fact of some
significance inasmuch as Mr. Lindquist, the bank officer handling the account, belieYed that once an offset
was made it had to be continued until the entire item
was paid (R. 96).
The applicatiou of the deposit to the note on October 18, 1965, was the last transaction in the account
except for service charges, debit memos for returned
checks, and two small deposits totaling $83.87.
The partnership ceased to do business, though
Joseph "\Vheat himself finished up the remaining work
on the Kennecott Building. At the time of Mr. '¥heat's
meeting with the bank officers, shortly after the October 18 set off, liabilities of 'Vheat Bros. totaled something in excess of $70,000.00 while the receivables totaled about $18,000.00 ( R. 57).
On December 8, 1965, yoluntary petitions in bankruptcy were filed by 'Vheat Bros. and the three partners ( Exs. P-1 through P-4) . The schedules showed
that the liabilities of the partnership and the partners
substantially exceeded the assets, which was true at all
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times withiu the four month period preceding bankruptcy ( R. 59-60) .

ARGlJ.MENT
POINT I
SECTION 68 OF TH.E BANKRUPTCY ACT
(11 L'.S.C. §108) HAS NO APPLICATION TO
THIS CASE.
Plaintiff agrees that if the \Vheat Bros. deposits
had been made in good faith, and in the ordinary course
of business, defendant would have a right of set off by
drtue of §68a of the Bankruptcy Act. But it is plaintiff's position in the present case that the preferential
transfers occurred when the deposits were made, not
wheu the bank set off the deposits in payment of Wheat
Bros. debts. In order for §o8a to apply, the deposits
must have been made in good faith, in the ordinary
course of business, and in a general account subject to
withdrawal.
In actions brought under Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, bank deposits have frequently been given
special treatment, with and without reference to Section
fi8, for the reason that although there is admittedly a
"transfer of property" by the depositor to the bank, the
transfer is often made in the regular course of business.
the depositor having the right to draw checks upon the
amount so deposited. All of the cases recognized, hmY-
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ever, that whether a bank deposit is a voidable preference depends upon the circumstances under which the
deposit was made. This is pointed out in 3 Collier 011
Banh:ruptcy (14th Ed.), Para. 60.15:
"As a general proposition it has been asserted
that such a deposit of funds differs from other
payments or transfers of money or property as
contemplated by Section 60, in that it is withdrawable at the will of the depositor and does
not operate actually to diminish the depositor's
estate. The reasoning has been that the ordinary
deposit results in substituting for currency, bank
notes, checks, drafts and other bankable items
a corresponding credit with the bank which may
be checked against or withdrawn, and which provides the depositor with the medium of exchange
in universal use in the transaction of business.

***"

Because of the possibility that banks, partly under
authority of Section 68 of the Uankruptcy Act, might
utilize deposits to effect prohibited preferences, the
courts have gradually worked out a set of principles,
governing bank deposits. They are summarized in J
Collier on Bankruptcy (14th Ed.), Para. 68.16[2]:
"The bo'eneral rule may
• first be stated that where
an insolvent debtor makes general deposits within four months of his bankruptcy, which deposits
are accepted in good faith and in the regular
course of business, the bank has a right to set off
such deposits against an obligation owing to it
by the depositor. * * *
"It is only where affairs have reached such a
point that the bank accepts the deposit for the
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purpose of payment, or of giving itself a subsequent advantage over other creditors through
its right of set-off, or for some other special purpose, that the deposit and the subsequent application of it amounts to a recoverable preference."
The courts are in agreement that when a deposit
is accepted for the purpose of payment of a debt, it constitutes a transfer of property which is voidable under
Section 60 and is not protected by the set-off provisions
of Section 68 of llankruptcy Act.

In Schmidt v. Bani.: of Commerce, 150 N .:M. 470,
llO Pac. 613 ( 1910), a trustee had brought action

against a bank for recovery of a deposit as a voidable
preference. The trustee pre\'ailed in the lower court
and 011 appeal the bank contended that it had the right
to set off for the reason that the deposit had been received in due course of business. The New
Supreme Court said:
"The court finds that the appellant pursuaded
and induced the bankrupt to pay to them the
amount of rnonev involved in this action for the
express purpose. and with the intent to apply
the same upon the indebtedness then owing by
the bankrupt to appellant. This being so, no question of the right of set-off for money deposited
in the ordinary course of business, arises."
In First National Bani..: of El Central v. Harper,
254 Fed. 641 (9 Cir., 1918), it was held that where deposits are made not in the usual course of business, but
to cover an overdraft, there is a preferential payment
and the set off doctrine will not apply. And in In re
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Henry C. Reusch & Co., 44 F. Supp. 677 (D.C .N.J.,
1942), the court held that a bank deposit made not i11
the usual course of business, but with the intent that the
deposit be applied to payment of an existing debt, is a
transfer of property and a preference within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act.
Kane v. First National Bank of El Paso, Te,r@,
56 F.2d 534 (5th Cir., 1932), was a case in which a
particular set off was upheld, but the bank recognized
the rule applicable to the present case, saying:
"\Ve thiuk that a deposit, though made by a11
insolvent, if ill due course of business and really
and in good faith intended at the time by th c
bani..: to create an equivalent liabili(lj to honor
the checks to the depositor, is not a present depletion of the depositor's estate, hut is a valid
banking transaction which may be set off thereafter; but if
bank in accepting the deposit
does not intend to become liable to the depositor,
but intends to uet payrnent by set-off, the advantaue obtained is rendered voidable by a bankruptcy within four month." [Emphasis added. J
0

The limitation on a bank's rights to receive deposits
and apply them on indebtedness is well stated in Citizens
·;yational Bank of Gastonia, N. C. v. Linberg er, 45
F.2d 522, 529 ( 1930), wherein the court stated:
"Of course, where deposits are not made in the
regular course of business,
whe:e they are
made fraudulently and collusIYely for the purpose of giving
bank a preference, or where
they are not in realitu deposits at all, but are pay-
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rncnts, the right of set-off does not e.i'ist, and
they may be recovered as preferential." (Emphasis added.)

The rule is again well stated in 4 Collier on Bankruptcy (14th Ed.), Para.
where the following statement is found:
''As previously indicated, it is absolutely essential that before a bank can exercise its right and
use the bankrupt's deposits as an offset, the
deposits in question must have been accepted in
good faith in the ordinary course of business.
The usual .r;enera/ deposits made on an open
checking account subject to withdrmtal at 7l'ill
con.c;titutcs the t,1Jpe of deposits which will more
often be considered above suspicion. But if the
deposits are not accepted in the ordinary course
of business, or are procured, accepted or 'built
up' for the real purpose of permitting the bank
to obtain a set-off, the deposits will be considered
voidable preferential transfers and the right of
set off is lost. * * * " (Emphasis added.)
See also, Annotation, "Set-off by Bank Against
Bankrupt's Deposit as a Preference "Tithin the Bankruptcy Act," 85 A.L.R. 369; and 9 Am. J ur. 2d, llankrnptcy,
The trial court found that the deposits in question
were not made in the ordinary rnurse of business, but
for the purpose of paying an antecedent debt. They
were accepted by defendant for that purpose, wtihout
regard to the intent of the depositor, and as the forego-ing cases show, a mutual intent in this regard is not

13

necessary. The question is whether defendant accepted
the deposits to let 'Vheat Bros. draw checks on them or
whether it accepted them for the purpose of paying its
debts.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COUU'l''S FINDINGS OF
FACTS SHOULD BE UPHELD UNLESS
THEY ARE CLEARLY AGAINST THE
'VEIGfIT OF EVIDENCE.
The argument of the defendant that the deposits
made by \Vheat Bros. were in good faith and in the
regular course of business and that it did not know or
have reasonable cause to believe that \¥heat Bros. was
insolvent at the time the deposits were made, must be
considered in light of the fact that the issues were tried
to the court on conflicting evidence, in a situation in
which the court had an opportunity to consider the demeanor of the bank's officers. On the conflicting evidence the issues were determined against the defendant
bank.
The Utah constitution, Article VIII, Section 9
provides that in equity cases the appeal may be on questions of both law and fact, while in cases of law "the
appeal shall be on questions of law alone."
Under that provision this court has consistently
recognized that in reviewing the findings and conclu-
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sions in an action at law the trial court will be sustained
unless that is no legitimate proof to support them, L,1111urn 11. rPown of Price, 08 Utah 90, 222 Pac. 599 ( 192.t);
or where there is "substantial evidence" to support them,
()shorn v. Peters, 69 Utah 391, 255 Pac. 435 ( 1927) or
unless the evidence "clearly through prepanderates"
against the decision, Barlt'er v. Dnnham, 9 Utah 2d 244,
;342 P.2d 867 (1959).
Article VIII, Section 9 does not define "law" or
"equity" cases for the purpose of determining the scope
of review, and admittedly, the question needs to be reexamined from time to time in light of new actions,
statutory
and remedies which may be provided under our general statute relating to the right to
trial by jury.
\Ve have been unable to find any Utah cases in
which a determination has been made as to ,vhether an
action to avoid preferences under Section 60b of the
Bankruptcy Act is an "equity case" or a "case at law"
for the purposes of review under the provisions of Article Ylll, Section 9, Utah Constitution. But most other
courts, including the federal courts, have regarded 60b
proceedings as essentially law actions. Certainly they
are more like law than equitable actions since there is
nothing in them upon ·which the discretion of the judge
or chancelor is required to operate.

l'/'(tl

The accepted principle is stated in 5 Moore's FedPractice, Para. 38.30[4}, as follows:
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" * * * Section 60b of the Bankruptcy Act
provides that ''Vhere the preference is voidable,
the trustee may recover the property or, if it has
been cmwerted, its value from any person who
has received or converted such property, except
a bona-fide purchaser from or a lienor of the
debtor's transferee for a present fair equivalent
value * * *' At one time, prior to the Federal
Rules, there was a division of authority whether
the trustee's plenary action, if brought in a federal district court, should be on the law or equity
side of the court-in other words whether it
was a 'jury' or 'court' case. The Court in Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Company [287 U.S. 92,
95, 53 Sup. Ct. 50, 77 L. Ed. 185 (1932)] settled the matter by applying the same principles
that it was accustomed to apply to other civil
actions * * * As applied to a plenary action
under the Rules the case means simply that if
either the plaintiff or the defendant makes a
timely demand for jury, an action by the trustee
to recover a money judgment or property preferentially transferred is legal in character and
hence a jury action, unless there are facts or
circumstances that render the legal remedy inadequate * * *."
See also, 3 Collier on Bankruptcy (14th Ed.), Par.
60.60 [1.2}.
The action in this case is essentially one at law within the meaning of the U tab Constitutional provision
relating to appellate review, and the appeal must be restricted to questions of ]aw. In J(eller v. Deseret Mortuary Company, 23 Utah 2d 1, 455 P.2d 197 (1969), in
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,vhich a trial court findi11g in a breach of contract was
being reviewed, the court said:
"The contract was silent as to the point of
dispute just stated. The trial court properly
heard extraneous evidence bearing on the issue,
which he resolved in favor of the plaintiff. Inasmuch as there is substantial, reasonable and
credible evidence to support his finding, it is
not our prerogative to upset it. This same wellworn and time-honored rule of review likewise
applies to and disposes of the defendant's contention that the trial court erred in finding that
the plaintiff had performed the construction in
a good and workmanlike manner; and to the
issue raised that the amount of damages awarded
was excessive, to which we next direct our attention."
Thus if there was any substantial evidence to support the findings of fact of the court below, the judgment should be affirmed. Determination of whether
there is substantial evidence should be made in light of
the fact that the trial court listened to the testimony of
the two officers of defendant who were in charge of the
branch which handled the transaction, and were directly
involved in them.
In Child v. Child, 8 Utah 2d 261, 332 P.2d 981
( 1958) which was essentially an equitable action the
trial court entered a judgment compelling re-conveyance of certain land. On appeal the defendant contended, among other things, that the findings were not
supported by the evidence, the plaintiff there having
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had the burden of establishing right to re-conveyance
by "clear and convincing evidence." In disposing of the
contention on appeal, the court said:

" * * * Inasmuch as the burden rests upon
the defendants to demonstrate that the trial court
was in error, the findings and judgrnent should
not be disturbed unless we can say affirmatively,
and with sorne dcyree of assurance, that there
is no reasonable base in the evidence upon which
he could fairly and rationally have thought that
the requisite degree of proof, i.e., by clear and
convincing evidence, was met." [Emphasis added.]
\Vith respect to the trial court's opportunity to
observe the witnesses the court said:
"Passing upon the credibility of witnesses
involves to some extent the judging of what goes
on in the minds of others and is therefore fraught
with uncertainty. * * * [The witness's] appearance and demeanor, his manner of expression
and his tone of voice, his apparent frankness and
candor, or want of it; his forthrightness in
answering, or his tendency to hesitate or evade,
and in fact his whole personality go into the
composite effect of the testimony. * * * In addition to the personality aspects involved in the
interpretation and evaluation of testimony, there
are also difficulties to be encountered because
of the uncertainaties found in the fact situations
themselves which must be correlated to the testimonv of the witnesses. 'Ve have heretofore
pointed out the trial court's advantages in judging the credibility of witnesses and
the facts. It is due to these considerations that
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it is firmly established that passing on such matters is exclusively within his province."
As will be pointed out hereafter, there is sufficient
evidence to support the findings made by the trial
court - whether the review is at law or in equity.

POINT Ill
THE EYIDENCE SUPP 0 RT S THE
COURT'S .FINDINGS THAT THE DEPOSITS
MADE BY \VHEAT BROS. \VERE :NOT
l\1ADE IN GOOD .FAITH AND IN THE REGULAR COURSE OF BUSINESS.
The burden on the appellant in this appeal is to
demonstrate that there is no substantial evidence to support the fin dings of the trial court. The fin dings rel a ting to the making of the bank deposits were as follows:
"5. On September 21, 1965, \Vheat Bros.
delivered to the defendant what was designated
a deposit in the said checking account. The deposit included, among other things, a check in
the amount of $18,150.00 drawn by Jacobsen
Construction Company payable jointly to '\Vheat
Bros. & Kaymac Sales.'

"6. The deposit of said $18,150.00 check was

made by \Vheat Bros. and received by defendant
for the purpose of clearing all or a portion of
the oyerdraft indebtedness referred to above, and
said check "'as applied by defendant upon payment of said overdraft. * * *
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"8. The deposit was not made and received

in the ordinary course of business, but for the
purpose of paying an antecedent debt.
"9. On October 4, 1965, \Vheat Bros. was

indebted to defendant on a promissory note in
the face [amount] of Five Thousand Dollars
dated l\tlay 19, 1965, and with a maturity date of
August 17, 1965.
"IO. On October 4, 1965, \Vheat Bros. left
with defendant a deposit in the amount of
$7 ,384.00 to be placed in its checking account,
whereupon the defendant immediately applied
$5,131.25 in payment of the entire principal and
interest of said note.
"11. The deposit was not made in the ordinary
course of business, but was accepted and received
by the defendant for the purpose of applying
it immediately in payment of the said promissory
note.
"12. At the time of the deposit and the appli-

cation thereof to the said note, no new consideration was given by the defendant to Wheat Eros.
and the deposit was made in payment of an
antecedent debt.
"13. On October 18, 1965, \Vheat Eros. was
indebted to the defendant on a promissory note
dated July 13, 1965, in the face amount of
$5,000.00, the note having become due on October 11, 1965.
"14. On or about October 18, 1965, Wheat
Eros. left with defendant a deposit of $4,153.48

to be placed in its checking account, whereupon
the defendant immediately applied $4,050.00
toward payment of the said note.
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"15. The deposit

was not in the ordinary
of business, but was accepted and received by defendant for the purpose of immediately applying it upon the payment of said
promissory note."
The findings make it clear that the court was not
dealing with the bank's right of set off as such, but with
the intent and purpose for which particular deposits
were made by ·yvheat Bros., or received by the defendant. Since it is the deposit and not the set off which is
the matter in controversy, defendant's extensive discussion of Section 68 of the Bankruptcy Act has no bearing
upon the accuracy of the court's findings of fact, or the
Yalidity of its conclusions of law.
The defendant seem to recognize this in its brief
when it states at page 11 that the "deposit is the key
factor in the allowability of set off and not the set off."
In this case there is ample evidence not only to
support the findings made by the trial court but to
demand them, particularly when considered in light of
the failure of the respondent to come forward with forthright explanations of the transactions in question.
With respect to the $18,150.00 deposit, the first
in the series, the evidence demands a finding that it
was not accepted and received by defendant in the
ordinary course of business. Prior to September 21,
1965, 'Vheat Bros.' overdraft had been building up
for a number of weeks and the bank officers had been
after the partners to make a deposit to "clear the over-
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draft" ( R. 83) . The deposit made on September 21
contained the $18,150.00 check in question together with
several small checks and one over $2,800.00 (Ex. P-10).
All but the $18,150.00 check were processed in the
usual manner, but it was singled out, removed from the
deposit, endorsed "for collection only., by an officer
of the bank, and hand-carried to the drawee bank where
a cashier's check payable to defendant 'vas obtained.
It was this cashier's check that was deposited in th.e
\Vheat Bros. account, and the overdraft was applied
against it simultaneously. As soon as the overdraft was
cleared, defendant changed its policy with respect to ,
'Vheat Bros. and overdrafts were no longer permitted
(R. 86).
Defendant's endorsing officer, l\fr. Boyd Lindquist, admitted that the $18,150.00 check was not handled in the regular course of business :

"Q. In the usual checking transaction, or deposit transaction, the bank does not endorse the
check for collection, does it, send it by messenger
or things of that kind, to obtain the funds, or
not in the normal course?

A. No." (R. 75).
"Q. That is to say that the Jacobsen check that
is 'P-11' was endorsed for collection, is that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. And was taken over to Zions by messenger,
was it?

A. Yes.
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Q. And collected at Zions, and was a cashier's
check obtain from Zions?

A. Yes.
Q. Now, who decided to handle that item in that
particular way ?
A. I would say .Mr. Yincent and myself.
Q. Did vou discuss the matter?

A. Yes.
Q. And discussed with .Mr. Vincent the advisability of having the item collected rather than

run through the ordinary course?

A. Yes." ( R. 82-83.
Other testimony indicated that such special handing
would be given deposits only if the depositor requested
it, or if the checks were large and there was a question
of their not being good, or of payment being stopped.
There was no concern on the part of defendant that
the check was no good or that payment would be stopped
inasmuch as the drawer, Jacobsen Construction Company, was one of the largest and most reputable contracting firms in the State.
Of great importance also is the fact that the
$18,150.00 deposit was specifically looked toward and
earmarked for the purpose of covering the overdraft.
The law is summarized in 4 Collier on Bankruptcy (14th
Ed.) Para. 68.16[2.l} as follows:

" * * * the deposits in question must have been
accepted in good faith in the ordinary course of
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busiuess. The usual general deposits made 011 au
open checking account subject to withdrawal at
will constitutes the type of deposits which will
more often be considered above suspicion. But
if the deposits are not accepted in the ordinary
course of business, or are procured, accepted o.r
'built up' for the real purpose of permitting the
bank tu obtain a
the deposits will be considered voidable preferential transfers and the
right of set-off is lost. * * * (Emphasis added.}
Defendant's argument that there must be "collusion," or at least a mutual intent or understanding between the depositor and the bank that the deposit will
be used to cover antecedent obligations, is not supported
by the authorities. As stated in the annotation at 85
A.L.R. 380:
"Thus, if a bank permits its debtor to continue
in business and to make deposits, knowing that
he is in failing circumstances, and with the intention of obtaining a greater share of his property
than other creditors, the deposits so made cannot
be set off against the bank's demands against the
depositor, although there is no proof of collusion
between the parties." (Emphasis added.]
In any event, the court could have found a mutual
intent. Mr. Lindquist testified as follows:
"Q. (By l\Ir. Allen). Will you relate the conversation between yourself and i\-1r. John \Vheat
on that occasion
to the financial condition, or obligations of \-\rheat Bros.?
A. At that time we made our visit there it was
primarily concernmg the overdraft which we
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were carrying on their account, and wished to
talk to him concerning clearing the overdraft.
They indicated to us at that time that they
would give us a list of accounts receivable from
various contractors that would be deposited to
the account.

"T

* * *

Q.
as there further specific conversation, .Mr.
Lindquist relating to which of the receivables
would be used for liquidation or clearing up of
their overdraft in your bank?
A. I am sure that we were looking to the Jacobsen deposit for clcariny t/ie immediate overdraft
that we had." (R. 102, 103) [Emphasis added.}
Subsequently .Mr. Lindquist testified:

"Q. No assignment was made to you by the
':Vheats of the Jacobsen money, was there?

A. No.
Q. And there was no set agreements, as far as

you are aware, that any particular moneys would
be used to clear the overdraft?

A. Well, we had a conversation that t/ie Jacobsen check would be deposited to the accownt, but
there was no assignment taken on it as such."
(R. 110).

The defendant's officers had even called Jacobsen
Construction Company to verify that the check would
be received by 'Vheat Bros. ( R. 108).
Of equal importance is the fact that ':Vheat Bros.
was never given any opportunity to draw against the
deposit. Thus, the rationale for excepting certain bank
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transactions from the effects of Section 60 are nut
applicable. The rationale stated in 9 Am. J ur. 2d, Bankruptcy, §525 is as follows:

"A deposit in the usual course of business in
good faith to the open or general account of the
depositor, subject to his check, does not result
in a preferential transfer, notwithstanding it
may replace the bank in position, in the event
of depositor's bankruptcy, to set off the deposit
against his debt to the bank. The rule applies
to a deposit made subject to the collection of the
definite items thereof if the intent at the time
of the deposit was that the checks against it
would be honored when the items were collected.
The principal reason which the courts have assigned for t,he rule is that when a deposit is made
under the circurnstances indicated, there is no
diminution of the depositor's estate, since he
thereby receives an equivalent credit, which u
immediately available to him." [Emphasis add- ,
ed.]
1

When the total deposit made on September 21 is
analyzed, the distinction becomes readily apparent. Of
that deposit the sum of $18,150.00 (evidenced by the
Jacobsen Construction Company check) was a preferential transfer. The balance was handled differently,
and probably was not. The bank had been waiting for
the Jacobsen check to cover the overdrafts, and as soon
as it was received it was given special handling and
used to pay the overdraft before Wheat Bros. had any
chance to draw against any part of it.
'Vhile the circumstances are somewhat different
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with respect to the two subsequent deposits found bv
the trial court to have constituted preferential transfers,
it is clear that the bank accepted each deposit for the
purpose of paying existing indebtedness.
When the \Vheat Bros. overdraft was cleared on
September 22, a small balance remained in the account
from which some checks were paid, but as soon as the
balance was exhausted, no checks were honored until
September 24 when a deposit of $999.56 was made.
Another deposit of $3,283.03 was made on September
29 and Wheat Bros. was permitted to draw on it. Even
before checks totaling the whole amount of the deposit
had been drawn defendant applied debit memos and
service charges against the account and commenced to
return checks and debit the account for their return.
\Vheat Bros.' checks were paid (from a credit balance
-uot by way of ovedraft) between September 30 and
October 4, at which time a deposit of $7,384.00 was
made. Immediately defendant set off $5,131.25, the
full principal and interest of a note which had become
due on August 17. It seems quite clear that the bank
had theretofore decided that as soon as the large enough
deposit was received, it would be used to pay the note.
This is consistent with Mr. Lindquist's understanding
that once set off is made, the bank must continue to
set off until the note is paid. The bank had allowed two
previous smaller deposits (neither large enough to pay
the note) to be drawn against ( R. 96) . These facts, considered in light of the bank's knowledge, its termination
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of overdrafts, and the constant vigilance with respect
to the 'Vheat Bros. account constitute ample evidence
to support a finding that the deposit was received for
the purpose of paying the note.
After appliction of the deposit to payment of the
first note, additional \Vheat Bros. checks were paid
from small credit balances until October u, when the
account was depleted. Defendant ceased paying checks
and debited the account $2.00 at a time for returne<l
items. A deposit of approximately $3, 700.00 was made
on October 8; but on October 11, when the second
$5,000.00 note became due, there was only $1,200.00
in the account. \Vheat Bros. drew checks on this amount
until the account was again depleted. Thenceforth
checks were returned and charges made. \Vhen a deposit
sufficient to pay most of the second $5,000.00 note was
received, the bank again decided to set off. On October
18, 1965, the date of Joseph \Vheat's deposit of
$4,153.48 to meet the partnership payroll, defendant '
applied a small portion of this to clearing an overdraft
(resulting primarily if not exclusively from debit
memos) and the balance in payment on the note.
In determining whether deposits are made in the '
ordinary course of business the courts may consider all
the circumstances surrounding the deposits including
the bank's knowledge of the depositor's financial condition and may make inferences from the failure of
the bank to come forward with any explanation surrounding the time sequence and the methods followed
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by the bank in making the offsets against the nole.
The rule is well stated in 9 Am. J ur.2d Bankruptcy,

as follows:

"A deposit may be preferential, where made
in the 4-month period, and not in the ordinary
course of business, but for the purpose of benefiting the bank by affording a setoff. Any state
of facts which takes a deposit within the 4-month
period out of the class of deposits made in good
faith in the ordinary course of business, subjec_t
to the depositor's check-in other words, any
situation under which the deposit is merely a
form of pa;yment to the bank-1narks the deposit
a preferential transfer which, if the necessary
knowledge of, or reasonable cause to believe in,
the insolvency of the depositor is present on the
part of the bank, constitutes a voidable preference precluding the possibility of a setoff. The
settled rule, it has been said, is that if the deposits
are made in order that the bank may apply them
to the reduction of the depositor's indebtedness,
there is in effect. a preferential payment, voidable in the event the bank had 'reasonable cause
to believe the debtor to be insolvent.'
"The same circumstances of preferential payment may be created where, although a deposit
is made in the usual course of business, the bank
intends thereby to obtain a preference, so that
the ordinary relation of banker and depositor,
wherebv the depositor receives in return for his
deposit. the obligation of the bank to repay him,
does not obtain." [Emphasis added. J
In a footnote to the above citation it is said:

"If at the time the deposits are received there
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is not an intent in good faith to increase the
checking account, but to arrange for an offset
there is in truth not a deposit, but a payment
which is a preference."
From a review of defendant's brief it would appear
that there is not much disagreement between the parties
over the principles of law relating to the above point.
Rather, the dispute is centered around the application
of such principles to the facts of this case ..Most of the
cases cited by defendant hold that if the deposit was
made or accepted for the purpose of paying existing
indebtedness there is no right of set off. They also
recognize that there is no right of set off unless the
deposit is subject to withdrawal at the will of depositor.
Both propositions are made abundantly clear in almost
every case and authority quoted by defendant in its
brief.
Defendant cites New York County National Ban/-.;
v. Massey, 192 U.S. 138, 40 L. Ed. 380, 24 Sup. Ct.
199 ( 1904), but in that case the court specifically noted
that there was no diminution of the bankrupt's estate
because he had a right to draw upon the deposit. That
case involved the usual situation where the bank is
both a creditor and a debtor of the bankrupt at the
time of the bankruptcy. The court allowed the bank to
set off amounts on deposit against an oYerdue promissory note. This is a far different thing than accepting
deposits before bankruptcy with the intent of applying
them against a debt
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Defendant also cites White v. Pacific Sout/i7.cesl
Trust & Savings Bank, 9 F.2d 650 (D.C. Calif., 1926)
and erroneously states that the court did not require
the two banks to return the money. Following the quotation which appears in appellant's brief, is this:
"Now, were the deposits in the two banks,
which were off set, general deposits made in the
ordinary course of business? I think not. Not
only was each bank fully acquainted with Foley's
financial difficulties from December, 1922, but
each bank had signed the agreements by which
Foley divested himself of his property and business.

*

*

*

*

"I conclude the main question in these cases
by holding that, as between the plaintiff trustee
in bankruptcy and each defendant bank, all of
the monev sued for should be delivered to the
plaintiff for administration and distribution in
accordance with the National Bankruptcy Law,
and each bank may enlarge, modify, or file claims
against the proper bankrupt estates for the
amounts of their claims, respectively, affected
by this decision."

Hughes v. Machen, 164 F. 2d 983 (4th Cir., 1947),
cited by defendant, involved two banks taking over deposits which had existed for some time and applying
them to large notes when they learned of the insolvent
condition of the bankrupt. In addition, one of the
banks, having received a check from the government
payable to the bankrupt, had delivered half of the proceeds to a third party and credited the balance against
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the bankrupt's notes. The trustees of the bankrupt entered into a compromise agreement under which one.
half would be returned to the trustee, but it was allowed
to retain the balance that existed in the account prior .,
to the set off. Certain creditors of the bankrupt objected.
The court noted that the creditors could not show that
deposits were built up in an abnormal way in order tu
give the bank an opportunity to credit them on the notes
and reduce the debt and also there had been no restric- '
tions placed on withdrawal from the accounts. The
court stated:
"Of course the application of these principles
presupposes that there has been a bona fide de- ·
posit made in due course of business. Thus where
there has been a deliberate building up of the
account for the purpose of enabling the bank to
obtain a preference, or where the deposit is
accepted by the bank with the intent of appl!Jiny it tu the depositor's obliyations rather than
subjecting it to his power of withdrawal, an attempt on the part of the bank to set off the
deposit will result in a preference as long as the
other conditions of Section 60 are satisfied. (Citing cases.) This result is reached because the
apparent deposit is in fact a payment to the bank
and the bankruptcy court will look through form
to substance and treat the deposit as a transfer
of property for or on account of an antecedent
debt." [Emphasis added. J

Defendant also relies upon Farmers Bank of
j}fissouri v. Julian, 383 F. 2d 314 (8th Cir., 1967). The
facts in that case are quite different from those in the
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present case. There the bank had the understanding
that its obligations would be paid as soon as the bankrupt obtained a long-term operating loan from Commercial Credit Corporation. The bank's officers had
gone to the banqrupt' s place of business to attend a
meeting with officers of the bankrupt and the credit corporation. At the meeting, it learned that the long-term
operating loan was not going to be made. Consequently
the officer returned to the bank and applied funds which
had been on deposit and subject to withdra>val by the
bankrupt right up until that moment, against a $lti,
000.00 promisory note. The court noted that certain
checks had been honored that very day from the existing account and indicated that there was no evidence to
show that the bank had decided to apply the set off any
earlier than that day. This is considerably different than
the present case where the bank waited to receive a
specified check and immediately grabbed it.
In the fairly recent case of Mayo v. Pioneer Bani.Trust Company, 270 F. 2d 823 (5th Cir., 1959), the
court held that a deposit made under similar circumstances was a voidable preference, and said:

'*

" * * * [T]he trustees could attack the set off
as a voidable preference if: (I) at the time of
the deposits either the company or the bank intended them to operate as payment of the debt
rather than as an ordinary deposit subject to the
depositor's withdrawal; ( 2) at the time of the
deposit the depositor was in fact insolvent; and
( 3) the bank had reasonable cause to believe the
33

depositor was insolvent at that time. Under the
facts surrounding the Twin City deposit ,1
think the deposit was for the purpose of
ment of the debt. As soon as Gray received tht
proceeds under the contract he transferred theu,
by debit memorandum to the Bank. The deposit
was rnade solely to repay the loan. It was a cloak
for payment." [Emphasis added.}

POINT IV
THE EVIDENCE SUPP 0 RT S THE
COURT'S .FINDING THAT AT THE TIME
THE DEPOSITS WERE MADE BY WHEAT
BROS., DEFENDANT HAD REASONABLE
CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT \VHEAT BROS.
\VAS INSOLVENT.
After hearing evidence, watching the demeanor of
the witnesses and reviewing the exhibits admitted, the
trial court was satisfied that at the time of each of the
transfers, defendant not only had reasonable cause to
believe that "\Vheat Bros. was insolvent but it actually
knew that it was (R. 21, .Findings Nos. 19-20).
Admittedly there is no direct testimony in this case
that defendant actually knew of Wheat Bros. insolvency at the time of the three transfers. However, the
evidence leads inescapably to that conclusion. Moreover,
the evidence is abundant that defendant had reasonable
grounds to believe that Wheat Bros. was insolventwhich is all the statute requires.
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'Vhile the question is primarily one of fact the
cases are helpful in describing the kinds of evidenee
establishing reasonable cause to believe.
One such case is Dean v. Planters National Bank
of Hughes, 176 F. Supp. 909, 914 (D.C. Ark., 1959) :

" * * * [T]here are a number of recurrent factors which are usually weighed and considered,
such as: under eapitalization of the debtor, sales
below cost, checks drawn on a bank account an<l
payment refused by reason of insufficient funds,
a consistent pattern of overdrafts, operating
losses, irregular, unusual or criminal conduct,
secretiveness, slow payment, collective measures
taken by other creditors, rescue of debtor from
embarrassment by friends or relatives, and reliance on financial statements or reports."
In Boston National Bank v. Early, 17 F. 2d 691
(1st Cir., 1927) a finding of reasonable cause to believe
was upheld. The court of appeals regarded it as significant that the president of the bank had renewed the
bankrupt's note several times and knew that deposit
balances were low, that checks were held until deposits
were made to meet them, that the bank had demanded
maintenance of a larger balance, that return of checks
was threatened, and that the bank finally took perishable merchandise as security.
Additional cases supporting respondent's position

are T,Vaite v. Second National Bank, 168 F. 2d 984 (7th
Cir., 1948), and In re Shelley Furniture, Inc., 283 }-..
2d .540 (7th Cir., 1960).
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1\-Ioreover, it is clear that a creditor may not bury
his head in the sand and ignore warning signals which
if followed up, would disclose insolvency. He may not
rely entirely upon the statements and representations of
the debtor, particularly when there are suggestions that
the debtor's representations may not be true. The court\
have uniformly followed the principle that if the credi.
tor has notice of facts which would cause a reasonably
prudent person to make inquiry he is chargeable with
knowledge of what the inquiry would have revealed.
The principle is explained in 3 Collier on Bankruptcy (14th Ed.) Para. 60.53[1] as follows:
"Knowledge of insolvency is not necessary,
nor even actual belief thereof; all that is required
is a reasonable cause to believe that the debtor
was insolvent at the time of the preferential
transfer. A creditor has reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent when such a
state of facts is brought to the creditor's notice,
respecting the affairs and pecuniary condition
of the debtor, as would lead a prudent business
person to the conclusion that the debtor is insolvent. Of course, a creditor may not willfully
close his eyes that he might remain in ignorance
of his debtor's condition. On the contrary, where
circumstances are such as would incite a man
of ordinary prudence to make inquiry, the creditor is chargeable with notice of all facts which
a reasonablv diligent inquiry would have disclosed. In ;uch case, an inquiry of the debtor
alone is generally insufficient, where
answer.
wider the circumstances, could i:ead1ly have
been found to be untrue. As a matter of fact, it is

36

the creditor's cause for belief and not the debtor's
knowledge, or lack of it, that is important. And
if the creditor fails to make an inquiry when he
has a duty to do so, he will be charged with all
the knowledge which he would have acquired
had he conducted the investigation."
In a case decided by the United States Court of
Appeals, for the Tenth Circuit, Carroll v. Holliman,
33ti F. 2d 4-25 (10th Cir., 1964) it was said:
"[l}f the creditor has knowledge or notice of
facts and circumstances which would incite a
person of reasonable prudence under similar
conditions to make an inquiry and, if such an
inquiry would lead to the development of facts
essential to the knowledge of the situation, the
creditor is chargeable with such knowledge."
Examining the evidence in the present case in light
of the foregoing principle it is apparent not only that
defendant had reasonable cause to believe that Wheat
l:lros. was insolvent, but that in fact (through its officers) it so believed. For several months prior to September 20, 1965, there had been a consistent pattern of
overdrafts in Wheat Bros.' account and they had been
increasing steadily ( R. 76). For weeks preceding September 20, the bank officers had on various occasions
contacted 'Vheat Bros. about clearing the overdrafts
(R. 83). On September 20, two checks payable to
Granite National Bank were presented to appellant's
officers for a decision as to whether they should be honored (R. 77). As a result, an inquiry was made and
appellant's officers learned that 'Vheat Bros. owed the
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Granite National llank $5,000.00, plus interest, on 0
note ( R. 79) . This was one of a number of liabilitie.1
which had not been disclosed on any financial statemeut
furnished by \Vheat Bros. to defendant. At about tht
same time, and prior to the deposit of the $18,150.00
check on September 21, officers of defendant made iuquiry to Intermountain Association of Creditmen anci
learned that Wheat Bros. had two substantial accounh
payable to Bennetts and Fuller Paint which also had
not been disclosed on the financial statement (R. 87).'
The $18,150.00 check drawn by Jacobsen Construction
Company was made payable to \Vheat Bros. and Kay.
mac, and contemporaneously with the making of the deposit a check drawn payable to Kaymac, in the amount
of $12,000.00, was presented to appellant for payment.
Payment was ref used which, consistent with the bank's
practice would indicate that either the manager or assistant manager or assistant manager had reason to
know that there was another very large obligation which
had not been disclosed to appellant. In fact, a few <lap
later, and prior to the payment of the first $5,000.00
note, one of the bank officers had a conversation with
an officer of Kaymac in which the bank officer was told
that the indebtedness to a Kaymac was approximately
$23,000.00 and the company was insisting on payment
(R. 92, R. 109) . .Moreover, \Vheat Bros. continued to
draw checks on insufficient funds, which were not honored, and the bank inquired from time to time of persons who were said to have owed money to \Vheat Bros.
The above circumstances were such that any reasonable
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person in the position of defendant would have made u
thorough inquiry as to the financial condition of Wheat
Hros.-and there are some indications that this is exaetly what defendant did.
There is little question that if an inquiry and particularly an examination of 'Vheat Bros.' books and records had been made by defendant the insolvent condition
of \Vheat Bros. would readily have become apparent.
After appellant took the deposit collected to meet
'Vheat Bros.' payroll, one of appellant's officers suggested to Joseph Wheat that the books and records of
the company be brought in. This was done and the bank
officers were immediately aware that \Vheat Bros. was
insolvent ( R. 106). Mr. 'Vheat was told that the only
hope for it was bankruptcy or a composition of creditors ( R. 62). Moreover, one of the bank officers at al!
earlier date had told Joseph '-'Theat that he had noticed
that ever since Jim Wheat had left the management of
the business it had gone down hill (R. 60). And, Jim
\Vheat had been out of the business about four years
IR. 61).

The circumstances surrounding the 'Vheat Bros.'
affairs were such that defendant must have known that
it was insolvent, and the obligation of defendant to have
made inquiry must be considered in light of its access
to various sources of financial information, as well as
that it had in fact received. It would be difficult to see
how the court could have failed to find that the bank
had reasonable cause to believe \Vheat Bros. was in-
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solvent on each of the dates on which transfers wert
made.

CONCLUSION
The policy of Section 60 of the .Bankruptcy Act is
to place creditors of the same class 011 an equal footing,
so as to prevent one creditor, through the exercise of
one type of pressure or another, from making itself'
whole, or nearly so) at the expense of the others.
Under Section 68 of the .Bankruptcy Act a bank
may take advantage of a right of set off-but only if
the
were received by the bank in the ordinary·
course of business and for the purpose of permitting the
depositor to use the account, as by withdrawal.
Circumstances surrounding the handling of the
Wheat Bros. account make it clear that the deposits in
question were not made in the ordinary course of busi- .
ness. The two officers in charge of the bank's Sugarhouse office exercised a continuing surveillance of the
Wheat Bros. account during all periods in which overdrafts were permitted. At no time was \Vheat Bros.
permitted to draw checks against its account at will. Al-'
though the bank had some customers who were "pref erred," and for whom tellers were generally authorized
to pay overdrafts, this was not the case with \Vheat
Bros. Before any \Vheat Bros. overdraft was paid, the
item was presented to either l\ir. Lindquist or l\fr. Yin-
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cent for consideration, at which time a determination
was made as to whether the item would be paid or not.
The trial court might well have found that the entire deposit made on September 21, insofar as it was
applied against the overdraft, was not received by the
bank in the ordinary course of business. It is arguable,
indeed. that where a bank's computer automatically
charges deposits against overdrafts, without first giving
the depositor an opportunity to draw against them,
such deposits cannot be made in the "ordinary course of
business" as that term is used in the older cases. Such
handling of an account becomes a personal matter in
which the bank officers, on a day-to-day basis, decide
whether to extend additional credit, and deposits and
withdrawals are incident to this activity.
At the time of receipt of the $18,150.00 check the
bank's officers had abundant information to the effect
that 'Vheat Bros. was not telling the truth about its
financial condition, that the condition was steadily
worsening, and that the company was, in fact, insolYent.
From that day forward, the information obtained by
and available to the bank with respect to the involvency
of 'Vheat Bros. never decreased. The "reasonable
cause to believe" was an ascending one.
Banks should be required to come forward with
forthright, believable testimony to a trial court respecting the circumstances surrounding deposits and set off's.
After all, what does a bank have to lose by taking a
preference? The most that is required of it under the
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Bankruptcy Act is that it pay back what it took, anli ·
stand in line with its fellow creditors. Defendant shoulci
do so in this case.
Respectfully submitted,
BRYCE E. ROE
340 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent
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